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It is acknowledged by most of the international community that climate change is 
one of the worst crises that humanity is facing nowadays. As countries keep making 
pledges to reduce the carbon emissions that led to global warming, carbon pricing 
has emerged as a cost-effective way to achieve these targets, since they turn these 
baneful emissions into a new commodity with a price equivalent to the cost imposed 
on the environment for that pollution. However, setting this price has proven to be 
difficult, as it needs to balance the required price to achieve ambitious mitigation 
goals, but also a price that is publicly accepted and not seen as unfair.  
This study focuses on presenting the general framework for carbon pricing as a 
climate change mitigation strategy, making especial reference to the case of France, 
where the combination of different carbon pricing mechanisms prompted several 
conflicts, particularly arisen by those mechanisms leading to different carbon 
prices. The research will attempt to econometrically assess whether the introduction 
of these carbon pricing mechanisms in France has led to lowered emissions since 
their implementation. 
Key words: Climate Change; Climate Change Mitigation; Carbon Pricing; 
Emissions Trading; Carbon Taxation; EU-ETS; Carbon Pricing in France. 
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A. Research topic 
Citizens all over the world have had different kinds of concerns during the last few 
decades. Some concerns only affected a part of them, such as local armed conflicts 
– even if their cruelty towards those citizens should had preoccupied the rest of the 
continents. Nevertheless, others have concerned people at a global scale, such as 
generalised economic crisis, or more recently, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which 
has hardly left any country out of the battle against it. 
In this last block of global concerns, one has remained a constant for quite a long 
time, ever since its first signs started to show up, and it is climate change. In January 
2021, while Europe was being hit by the third wave of the health crisis, the 
Copernicus Climate Change Service, the European climate observing program 
dependant on the European Commission (EC), reported that 2020 was the warmest 
year on record for the old continent, and that CO2 emissions continued to rise 
(Copernicus Climate Change Service, 2021). 
Before introducing more about the subject of climate change, it would be useful to 
establish the distinction between to concepts that are usually blended together that, 
even if they are interrelated, should be differentiated: climate change and global 
warming. 
On the one hand, climate change is the long-term change in the average weather 
patterns that have come to define the local, regional, and global climates of the 
Earth (National Geographic Encyclopaedia, 2019). The planet has over 4.5 billion 
years of history, and its climate has not always remained constant. Yet, when we 
talk about climate change, we primarily refer to the one that the Earth has been 
undergoing since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the 19th century, 
caused by increased human activity. Hence the difference with previous variations. 
On the other hand, global warming is used to define the long-term increase of the 
Earth’s temperatures, all around the globe, due to certain gases, such as carbon 
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dioxide (CO2) or methane (CH4), known as greenhouse gases (GHG), being trapped 
in the air masses surrounding the planet and preventing heat from escaping back to 
the space (National Geographic Encyclopaedia, 2019), especially the warming 
relative to the period 1850–1900. This increase in the average temperatures can 
have devastating effects on life as we know it and it is the major driver of climate 
change. Therefore, the terms are often used interchangeably, but the latter only 
refers to the warming produced by humans. 
Since the climate change issue was put on the table, it has been the subject of 
multiple international panels and discussion forums. Different options have been 
regarded as strategies to slow down uncontrolled climate change, but there is 
international consensus on reducing carbon, and more generally GHG, emissions, 
being the best strategy. Moreover, while reducing emissions can be done through 
different techniques, one has been favoured above the rest: carbon pricing. 
Carbon pricing consists essentially in turning carbon emissions into a commodity, 
attaching a price to them, although they never had one before. In fact, the cost of 
carbon emissions has not been born by those who emitted them but imposed on 
humanity through accelerated climate change. With carbon pricing, once emitters 
fully internalise emission costs, they are incentivised to reduce them. The 
internalisation is possible through two different techniques, emissions trading 
schemes, and carbon taxes. In this research paper, the role of both on reducing 
emissions will be assessed through an econometric case study of France’s carbon 
pricing mechanisms. 
B. Research structure 
To fully understand the importance of climate change and its role in current 
societies, this research paper is structured in three major blocks. The first one 
consists of an introduction to the subject of climate change and global warming. It 
presents its origin, and the consequences of disregarding climate change as one of 
the major threats for life on the Earth. As natural sciences prevail in the beginning, 
other disciplines, such as economic sciences or engineering sciences take the role 
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further down this block, as they become essential, not to understand climate change, 
but to fight it off, through the different approaches on dealing with it. 
As these approaches are presented in the previous block, mitigation strategies take 
precedence, being carbon pricing the most favoured policy. Accordingly, the 
second block analyses carbon pricing in depth, illustrating on its economic and legal 
basis, and pinning down the two most relevant carbon pricing mechanisms. Besides, 
a comparison on the advantages and disadvantages of each is made, and a brief 
display of the current spread of these mechanisms worldwide is shown. 
Once the fundamentals of carbon pricing mechanisms are clear, the third and final 
block consists of a case study of France, a country whose story with carbon taxes 
illustrates on the difficulties policymakers must deal with, to successfully 
implement carbon taxes within its borders. In particular, because it is a context in 
which different carbon pricing mechanisms co-exist, each with a different carbon 
price, and the creation of exemptions can attempt against the principle of tax 
fairness. Firstly, the current status of France’s carbon emissions will be seen in 
broad strokes, to understand the magnitude of their emissions problem. 
Subsequently, each carbon pricing mechanism in France will be analysed separately 
and on different levels to judge on the effectivity of carbon pricing to reduce carbon 
emissions. 
C. Methodology 
The methodology that will be used to cast a light on the efficacy of each carbon 
pricing mechanism to reduce carbon emissions in France will be a combination of 
statistical science with other disciplines, such as legal sciences, natural sciences, 
chemistry, or engineering, and with other disciplines as economics in many 
different aspects, such as climate economics, macroeconomics and econometrics, 
since carbon pricing mechanisms are economic tools.  
However, our approach will be characterized by the predominance of statistical 
analysis applied to economics, therefore, econometrics, an analysis performed 
using RStudio. In this sense, the other disciplines only provide additional 
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interpretative support for the econometric focus and they will be useful to 
understand the reports, datasets, and academic articles when they become too 
technical for general knowledge on climate change and carbon emissions. 
In base of this methodology, the datasets on carbon emissions for France and French 
companies subject to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, besides those 
on the evolution of the carbon price for each, will be analysed. Once we have a 
general idea of how both carbon pricing mechanisms have evolved since their 
implementation, emissions trading and the carbon tax in France will be statistically 
examined.  
The final objective of this work is to provide some clarity on our doubts regarding 
the suitability of current carbon pricing mechanisms as a mean of fighting climate 
change, but also that people who read this research paper are encouraged to delve 
more deeply in the topic of climate change and in the need to price carbon emissions 




II. Climate change and global warming 
A. The origin of climate change 
It is commonly accepted that climate change is one of the major threats that 
humanity is currently facing. Other serious crises have proved to be short-lived 
compared to the long period of time through which climate change effects will 
extend. Economic crisis, wars, and even pandemics tend to follow the same path: 
the emergence of the issue, the development of the conflict, the process of the 
introduction of measures to fight it off, and eventually, the arrival of its end.  
If its consequences on the population were negligible – which, of course, are not, 
due to the numerous casualties that are produced during them -, the main take away 
from crises is that a solution eventually arrives. With climate change, it is not so 
obvious. Moreover, if in the previous examples, one can wait until the rise of the 
crisis to work on a solution – the implementation of economic reforms, the finding 
of a vaccine or the establishment of multilateral panels –, that is not the case with 
climate change. 
As it was seen before, the climate change that is of our concern is the one that 
gathers the changes experienced since the early 20th century, due to increased 
human activities during the second industrial revolution occurred worldwide, even 
if the first signs of global warming date as far back as in the 1830s in some regions 
(Abram, 2016). 
Out of these human activities, the ultimate and most noteworthy source of global 
warming is the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, or natural gas. It leads to 
emissions of CO2, as shown in Figure 1, a type of GHGs that accumulates in the 
atmosphere and that prevents the heat emitted by the Earth from escaping back to 






Evolution of worldwide CO2 emissions by source since 1860, in million tonnes  
 
Note. There was an exponential increase in CO2 emissions during the 
20th century, especially after the Second World War. Source: Jancovici 
(2013). 
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere are measured in parts per million (ppm). The 
level of concentration is determined by the imbalance between carbon sequestration 
– e.g., by its burial in sediments, or the capture by plants –, and carbon emissions – 
e.g., by the burning of fossil fuels, rock weathering or volcanic activity –. The 
imbalances create trends that affect global temperatures, and thanks to the modern-
day study of the ice cores, it is possible to draw approximate values for past trends 
in concentration. 
While there are no direct measurements of CO2 concentration levels from the pre-
industrial era, there is general agreement on pre-industrial CO2 concentrations of 
around 280 ppm (Wigley, 1983). Moreover, looking further back into the data 
extracted from ice caps, through the several interglacial and glacial periods that the 
Earth has experimented in the last 800,000 years, CO2 concentration levels were 
never higher than 300 ppm (Lüthi et al., 2008). At present, despite the seasonal 
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cycles that affect monthly averages, the levels have not gone below 400 ppm since 
2015, as it can be seen in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Trend in atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 1959 to present, recorded by the 
Mauna Loa Observatory, in parts per million 
 
Note. CO2 concentration levels have experienced an exponential 
growth during the second part of the 20th century. The Mauna Loa 
Observatory provides the longest record of direct measurements of CO2 
in the atmosphere. Source: Global Monitoring Laboratory. 
Unless strong steps are taken, concentration levels reaching 700 – 800 ppm by the 
end of this century, as estimated by models considering current growth, could 
translate into an average temperature warming of 1.7 – 5.4 ºC by the year 2100 
(Backlund et al., 2008). 
Gradually, international efforts have aimed at establishing a temperature target to 
limit the effects of climate change. In 1992, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted, in which its Article 2 only 
required the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
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level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system”.  
After the celebration of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009 – the 
15th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC-, the international community 
agreed on limiting the global temperature rise to below 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels. Yet, lack of unanimous recognition by all parties of the Copenhagen Accord 
led to the 2 ºC target not being legally binding (Gao et al., 2017).  
However, it was only following the celebration of the Paris Climate Change 
Conference in 2015 – COP 21 to the UNFCCC – that the temperature target of 2 ºC 
achieved a legally-binding status, encouraging parties of the Paris Agreement to 
hold the “increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the 
risks and impacts of climate change” (Article 2 a)).  
Resulting from the COP 21, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), released a special report (2018) regarding this target, in which among its 
results, it found that there were evidently “clear benefits to keeping warming to 
1.5ºC rather than 2ºC or higher” (p. v). For that matter, “limiting warming to 1.5ºC 
can go hand in hand with achieving other global goals such as the Sustainable 
Development Agenda” (p. vi). 
Therefore, in terms of climate change, the temperature targets can be linked with 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 70/1, which lays down 
“a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity”. It contains the aforementioned 
Sustainable Development Agenda, also known as Agenda 2030, in which seventeen 
Sustainable Development Goals are laid out, along with one-hundred sixty-nine 
targets to achieve sustainable development, among others, in an environmental 
dimension (Díaz, 2016). The main SDG in the field of climate change is Goal 13, 
which aims at taking “urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”. 
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However, while most mitigation options consisting of limiting the temperature rise 
below 1.5ºC will show, not only strong synergies with Goal 13, but also those 
related to health (Goal 3), clean energy (Goal 7), cities and communities (Goal 11), 
or oceans (Goal 14), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has 
found (2019) that, even if the Paris Agreement’s commitments are effectively 
implemented, temperatures are predicted to rise by 3.2 ºC. Furthermore, they have 
estimated that it would be necessary to cut global GHG emissions by 7.6 per cent 
every year between 2020 and 2030, to not miss the opportunity of reaching the 1.5 
ºC Paris Agreement goal. Yet, for 2020, despite the global pandemic and the 
reduction of human activity, estimations for GHG emission reductions are below 
6%, according to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). 
In any case, an important take away of these climate actions particularly focused on 
temperature targets are that concerns regarding this warming are not due to the 
temperature rise per se, but the devastating effects an increase of such degrees will 
have on human life and natural systems. 
B. The consequences of uncontrolled climate change 
When addressing the consequences of climate change, we are no longer assessing 
the changes that have already taken place but forecasting the impact that the 
continuity of these changes will have on humans and other living systems. 
Before starting with the study of the forecasted impacts, a difference should be 
established between managed and natural systems, in which the impacts of climate 
change will take place. Managed systems are generally defined as those with 
substantial human inputs, in which societies could take steps to ensure a sustainable 
use of the resource. Namely, agriculture or indoor living, as they can fairly be 
adapted to new climate conditions. Natural systems are, on the other hand, 
unmanaged, either because humans choose not to intervene, or because they are too 
large to be controlled. For instance, the sea-level rise or extreme natural phenomena 
(Rosenzweig et al., 2007). 
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The distinction between managed and unmanaged is not trivial. Placing each system 
of our concern in a spectrum that goes from extensively managed to unmanageable 
helps to understand which areas should be of the greatest concern when it comes to 
climate change, in contrast to those where humans might be able to adapt to, despite 
requiring costlier technologies and measures (Nordhaus, 2015). 
An area of great concern is agriculture and farming, as it is the most sensitive to 
climate. The idea is that the economic impact of temperature increases is likely to 
be small, as technological developments eventually take place in the sector and a 
lesser part of the population relies economically on agriculture (Rosenzweig and 
Parry, 1994). However, the further we go into the future, the more uncertainties 
regarding the impacts on food production arise, which is worrying because it is 
strictly related to human health issues due to global warming, such as malnutrition. 
Uncontrolled climate change also has the potential to affect human health in other 
areas, such as an increase of diarrheal diseases and the spread of diseases such as 
malaria (Wright et al., 2021). Still, these impacts are likely to be over-dimensioned, 
as the degree of improvement of health technologies is unforeseeable. Just as in 
agriculture, the impacts are likely to be unfavourable if they are particularly not 
properly managed. 
The real concerns of climate change are focused in four major unmanageable 
threats, closer to natural systems than managed ones: sea-level rise (SLR), ocean 
acidification, hurricane intensification, and ecosystem losses (Nordhaus, 2015). Not 
only because they are unmanageable, but also because an economic assessment of 
their impacts makes us give a certain a price on the loss of human life, biodiversity 
or on forced migration, consequences of climate change (Roca, 2018). 
SLR is the most worrying because the rise affects the whole globe and it is difficult 
to stop once it has started – even if policies are enforced from now on, some SLR 
is expected to happen due to current rising and its inertia. Economic losses might 
be small, but they might still affect precious human and natural heritages. Countries 
therefore will have to choose between retreating due to SLR or defending 
themselves from SLR (Bosello et al., 2007).  
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Ocean acidification, on the other hand, is not the result of higher temperatures, but 
of higher carbon concentrations in the atmosphere. Part of that carbon is absorbed 
by the oceans, but it makes the ocean more acidic, lowering concentrations of 
calcium carbonate, and affecting marine organisms that live in the upper layers of 
the ocean and biologically rely on calcium carbonate. The ocean acidification has 
the potential to affect the distribution of marine species, and upon humans, it is 
likely to affect our fishing habitudes (Nordhaus, 2015). 
Climate change also has the potential to affect the intensity of hurricanes. They are 
formed when warm moist water over ocean waters rises, is replaced by cooler air, 
which in turn is warmed up as well. This continuous replacement of air masses 
forms storm clouds, which, using the spin of the Earth, increase the speed of the 
cycle and end up forming hurricanes. Hotter oceans will create more favourable 
scenarios for hurricanes to arise, and while the effects on the coastal areas where 
they strike are predictable through models, the economic impacts of increased 
hurricane intensity will depend on the ability of human life to adapt to them 
(Nordhaus, 2015). 
The last of the four largest unmanageable threats of global warming is the loss of 
biodiversity. Five mass extinctions have already taken place in pre-human eras. 
Biologists now agree that we have entered the beginning of a sixth mass extinction, 
in which about 75% of the planet species will be lost (Briggs, 2017). It is estimated 
that current extinction rates are 1,000 times higher than the natural background rate, 
and future rates are likely to be 10,000 times higher (De Vos, 2014). As biodiversity 
is a nonmarket good, estimating the impact of climate change is economically 
difficult, but as we put a price on extinguishing life, it also becomes a moral issue 
not any easier to solve. 
In conclusion, climate change and global warming are serious issues humans all 
over the globe are facing nowadays, and as long as they have the potential to 
negatively affect us to the extent we have seen supra, it is easy to understand 
something has to be done to slow the effects down as much as possible. 
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C. Economic approach to climate change 
Climate change and global warming are environmental phenomena. That is the 
reason why its impact is researched by environmental scientists, or why the 
evolution of the global temperatures and the CO2 concentration levels are studied 
by atmospheric scientists, like chemists and physicists. Yet, the present research is 
not the first in an economic field that deals with climate change, nor will be the last. 
It is important to understand the reason why.  
The subject of climate change needs the involvement of natural sciences, which are 
essential to understand why it occurs and to determine the pace and regional 
dimensions of change. However, global warming begins and ends with human 
activities. Consequently, even if we cannot expect to understand the implications 
of the warming itself without the findings and overviews provided by earth 
scientists, social sciences are required to intervene once it is understood that 
economic activities are the primary source of climate change.  
As a consequence, behavioural scientists are useful to understand the behavioural 
patterns of individuals, and to draw ideas on how to disincentivise these harmful 
behaviours. For instance, taxing the undesired behaviours has proved, most of the 
time, useful to discourage them (Yakobi et al., 2020). Once the behaviours are 
identified and are tackled, the drawing of integral economic policies is necessary, 
requiring economists to draw economic models to integrate these policies and make 
estimations on the expected evolution of patterns, to assess the necessity of new 
measures. Therefore, the combined efforts of earth scientists and economists are 
suitable. 
Nevertheless, climate change is not a crisis that can be solved through individual 
efforts alone. To slow the pace and to eventually prevent climate change, it is 
required to have effective, enforceable climate laws. Likewise, these laws must be 
adhered by most of the international community, although this proves to be difficult 
to achieve through current international agreements, with vague goals, inexistant 
pathways, and yet, the possibility of withdrawing at will.  
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Effective policy must be global, include mechanisms to encourage participation and 
discourage free riding - as mitigation action costs are high, incentives for smaller 
regions to free ride on the commitments of larger ones emerge (Perdana and Tyers, 
2020). The discipline of Law finds its role in this flank of the battle. In fact, since 
the Kyoto Protocol was agreed in 1997, a twenty-fold increase in climate laws and 
policies has produced, going from around 60 to over 1,200 in early 2017 
(Nachmany et al., 2017). Even besides international commitments, legally binding 
measures adopted by countries require a legal document to express their will to 
involve all their citizens. 
In these pages, some of these mechanisms, such as the adoption of unilateral acts 
to fight the effects of climate change, will be reviewed. In particular, the adoption 
of environmental taxes, to levy the emissions of GHG by companies and 
households, or the creation of markets where allowances to emit carbon are bought 
and sold. 
D. Addressing climate change 
As the consequences of climate change were examined, it has come as obvious that 
the world in which we live today is expected to change in the future. About these 
changes, we have the certainty about them happening, as their realisation obeys to 
scientific ground rules. Nevertheless, these changes are not predictable, since it is 
very difficult to know the exact moment in the future in which they will take place. 
Acting on climate is one of the most urgent issues humanity must deal with 
nowadays. Yet, as the most dramatic changes seem likely to be happening with a 
certain margin of time, three different approaches appeared on how to deal with 
climate change: adaptation, geoengineering, and mitigation. 
i. Adaptation 
The first approach to deal with the future impacts of climate change is adaptation. 
It essentially consists of learning to cope with the higher temperatures worldwide, 
as part of the expert opinion considers that it is easier to learn to live with the 
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changes rather than spending large amounts of money to prevent the effects of 
global warming (Nordhaus, 2015). 
Technically, the IPCC (2018) defines adaptation as a “process of adjustment to 
actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to 
moderate, avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, 
human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects” 
(p. 1758). These adjustments can be extended to the many assets that sustain us: 
agriculture, water-management, infrastructures, transport, etc. However, adaptation 
presents some drawbacks that are worth considering. 
Firstly, while the economic sacrifice of reducing emissions might seem a priori 
larger, adaptation is not costless, especially for small islands and low-income 
countries (International Monetary Fund, 2019). Money will need to be invested to 
improve land management in agriculture, develop water storage and conservation 
techniques in water management, relocate cities threatened by SLR, or realign 
roads, railways, and other infrastructures. And while some adaptation options could 
be implemented in some sectors at low-cost, comprehensive estimates for global 
costs are limited, as the timeframe is extended further down the future. 
Secondly, while prevention through the reduction of GHG emissions is global, 
adaptation is local, for a certain territory and group of people. The people that 
approve adapting measures bear with the costs of their implementation. Therefore, 
the capacity to adapt is intimately connected to social and economic development, 
which is unevenly distributed across and within societies (IPCC, 2007). For that 
reason, leaving all climate change issues to adaptation implies leaving countries 
that cannot afford adaptation behind, further widening the breach between the rich 
countries and poorer ones. 
Hence, adaptation might be useful, or even necessary, in the future, to deal with 
some of the threats from a warmer world, especially in managed sectors, but it is a 
complement of mitigation (European Environment Agency, 2013), as in 




Geoengineering is the second approach to slow climate change, which consists of 
offsetting the warming due to GHG emissions with cooling devices. It has been 
defined by The Royal Society (2009) as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of 
the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change” (p. 1). As 
efforts through international agreements to reduce carbon emissions have not fully 
worked and the 1.5 ºC target becomes more remote, the scientific community has 
become increasingly interested in the geoengineering approach (Reynolds, 2019). 
The geoengineering approach aims to intervene in the Earth’s climate system 
modifying the planet’s energy balance to reduce and stabilise the temperature at a 
level other than the current climate change pace leads us to.  
The methods used are diverse but can be divided in two groups. On the one hand, 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods, which aim to reduce the concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere, so that outgoing heat radiation can continue to escape. An 
example is ocean fertilisation, which involves reducing CO2 levels in the air by 
stimulating the photosynthesis of phytoplankton in the upper layer of the ocean. On 
the other hand, solar radiation management (SRM) methods, which aim to slow the 
increase on or reduce global temperatures by reflecting the sun’s energy. One 
example is white roof methods and the brightening of human settlements, as a way 
to increase the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface. 
The drawbacks of geoengineering arise from the lack of experience with them. 
While geoengineering and weather modification proposals date as far as in the 19th 
century, no complete CDR o SRM technology yet exists, and no large-scale 
geoengineering experiments have been carried out. Cost estimates indicate that, if 
technologies happen to be prosperous, geoengineering would be much less 
expensive than reducing CO2 emissions. Yet, major issues of these technologies 
revolve around the ignorance of their effectiveness and the possible side effects 
(Nordhaus, 2015). 
Furthermore, the existence of geoengineering also poses problems regarding the 
potential of these technologies to become climate warfare, as John von Neumann 
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(1955), founder of game theory, already remarked in the 1950s. Political problems 
caused by geoengineering can appear once a country engages in climate 
management technologies on their own, as a solution to a global problem cannot be 
imposed by one region. Any responsible geoengineering project will need to be 
negotiated at an international level, to kick them off, but also to prepare a 
compensation scheme for regions affected by the side effects of the geoengineering 
technologies (e.g., decrease in precipitation), to be ‘made whole’ again (Heyward, 
2014). Therefore, in terms of international relations, geoengineering might be just 
as difficult as a mitigation approach. 
The uncertainties regarding geoengineering are not small, but experts remark that 
these should not encourage us to directly dismiss it (Leal-Arcas and Filis-
Yelaghotis, 2012). Continuing research and experience with technologies can help 
us understand the methods, and they could be included as a part of a wider portfolio 
of responses to approach the climate change issue, together with adaptation efforts 
and mitigation. Geoengineering should not be regarded as the solution to climate 
change but be presented as an emergency ‘handbrake’ to be implemented in 
exceptional cases. For that to work, climate communicators will also have to start 
an open debate with society members so that extreme depictions of these 
technologies do not rise problems in terms of potential moral hazards (Raimi et al., 
2019). 
iii. Mitigation 
Both adaptation and geoengineering as means to slow climate change propose 
approaches which do not come without some drawbacks. Whilst they are not fully 
satisfactory solutions for the threats that climate change poses, there is only one 
acceptable in the long run, which implies reversing the GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere, and it is preventing climate change through mitigation. 
Mitigation is the most favoured approach to deal with climate change, which 
essentially consists of reducing the GHG emissions that reinforce the global 
warming, being CO2 emissions the most important, but also other long-lived 
GHGs, like methane, and short-lived, like aerosols. The technical definition by the 
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IPCC (2018) is the “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks 
of greenhouse gases” (p. 1769).  
It is considered the safest approach because it aims at avoiding the gamble that 
climate change effects are – it does not wait until these are produced and we adapt 
to them, nor relies in potential-yet-inexistent technologies to deal with it in the 
future. As it has been discussed supra, the effects of climate change are certain in 
their realisation but uncertain in their extent. Estimates might be close to the real 
estimates, but there are factors, such as the existence of tipping points (Russill and 
Nyssa, 2009), that are not fully considered, and their exceeding might turn these 
effects irreversible, so avoiding these uncertainties is the shrewdest move. 
Within climate change mitigation strategies, several approaches are considered to 
reduce GHG emissions: slowing overall growth of economies; reducing energy 
consumption; reducing carbon intensity of production of goods and services; and 
removing post-combustion carbon emissions from the atmosphere. Again, each 
presents some disadvantages.  
As a matter of fact, causing a recession can reduce carbon emissions and benefit the 
environment, but it is not recommended for the price to be paid, as it reduces the 
growth on other dimensions, such as health, that are just as important for human 
life. And carbon capture and sequestration, that is, capturing CO2 through 
technologies at the time of combustion and ship it off somewhere before it enters 
the atmosphere, is technologically feasible, yet economically difficult and 
controversial, due to the process of sequestration being expensive, and the transport 
and storage process posing safety and health problems if leakage is produced 
(Nordhaus, 2015). 
In any case, there is international agreement on the need to reduce emissions. After 
the Paris Agreement, 190 parties submitted “Nationally Determined Contributions” 
(NDC), unilateral commitments on reducing GHG emissions. However, these 
pledges are heterogenous (in terms of targets, stringency, or baseline years for 
reduction targets), insufficient to meet temperature targets, and might only have 
limited impacts for the largest emitters (International Monetary Fund, 2019).  
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Consequently, it is still necessary that all countries participate equally in the 
mitigation strategies for them to work. However, countries are made up of societies, 
which in turn are made of individuals. Individual choices are, therefore, the source 
of the increase or decrease on emissions from a certain region. Economic history 
has shown us that market mechanisms are a useful tool to affect individual 
decisions, and the one that is missing nowadays to encourage the behaviour of 
individuals to reduce emissions is a widely spread carbon pricing mechanism. 
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III. Fighting global warming through carbon pricing 
The idea behind carbon pricing is that economic incentives are essential for 
individuals to change their consumption habits. As for now, in many of the world 
regions, carbon emissions have no costs for those responsible for them, even though 
they evidently impose a cost on society through the worsening of climate change. 
These costs are not reflected in prices and consumers do not have an incentive to 
choose among low-carbon options, because there are many fields in which they are 
not easy to identify (namely, food options), or they just simply do not want to bear 
the higher prices of low-carbon options, as cheaper higher-carbon options are 
available. 
Carbon pricing, as a mitigation mechanism to reduce GHG emissions worldwide, 
relies on the basis that once the costs of carbon emissions are integrated in consumer 
prices, carbon-intensive goods will be emphasised in the eyes of the consumer, as 
they will rapidly increase the prices of these, compared to other low-carbon goods. 
Moreover, higher-carbon options will fairly compete with low-carbon goods in 
terms of final prices, so companies will be encouraged to reduce the emissions in 
their production processes to continue offering competitive prices (Branzini et al., 
2017). In the following pages, emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes will be 
presented as carbon pricing mechanisms. 
A. Fundamentals of carbon pricing 
Carbon pricing consists fundamentally in putting a price on carbon emissions, as it 
can be interfered from its name. This technique to internalise the costs of carbon 
emissions that are normally not reflected in the prices of products can be justified 
both from an economic and a legal perspective. 
i. Economic basis: externalities 
The GHG issue is a case of a market failure. Market failures can be defined as the 
inefficient allocation of resources in a free market, inefficiency that can be caused 
by a wide variety of reasons. One of them is the existence of negative externalities, 
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in which costs are imposed to a third party. In our case, the real cost of climate 
change is imposed on humanity in general, while it should be held by those 
responsible of the carbon emissions. It is considered, by some, “the greatest 
example of market failure ever witnessed” (Stern, 2008, p. 1). 
Ever since the industrial revolution began, companies have not born the full cost of 
their production, namely the environmental damages, and have imposed the costs 
that arise from pollution on society at large, as they could offset part of their costs 
with their externalisation through the pollution of air and water (Andrew, 2008). 
Through this method of cost abatement, human activities have already caused a 
global warming of an estimated 1.0 ºC (± 0.20 ºC) with respect to pre-industrial 
levels (IPCC, 2018). Keeping in mind the goal of maintaining the increase in 
temperatures below 1.5 ºC by around the year 2100, the concept of paying for 
carbon emissions from now on is not only fair, but also necessary, if the 
aforementioned wants to be achieved at the end of the century. 
Society in general consumes the environment without having to compete with one 
another and at nil or little cost. As the environment is a commodity whose existence 
benefits everyone, people can enjoy the advantages of it without having to pay 
anything. But since it has shown an apparent abundance, an over-consumption of 
the environment has taken place. Pollution has been possible because the 
environment is a classic example of a public good. However, to deal with global 
public goods, like the environment, it is difficult to properly locate the decision 
making at a level that can efficiently coordinate solutions (Nordhaus, 2007).  
Economic activities have been responsible of the over-consumption of the 
environment, but despite the apparent inexhaustible supply of it, society today is 
bearing with the long-term consequences of this – a free-of-charge over-
consumption has proved to not be sustainable (Andrew, 2008). Since polluters 
benefit from not having to pay for the pollution, it is only economically sound that 
part of the profits of free pollution are returned to the authorities in charge of 
inspecting, controlling, and adopting measures to contain the pollution generated 
by those activities (De Sadeleer, 2012). 
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ii. Legal basis: polluter-pays principle 
The desire of economic growth, combined with the fact that generating carbon 
emissions has turned out to be free ever since the industrial revolution began, has 
raised climate change as one of the most important challenges society is facing 
nowadays (Vinogradov and Soldatova, 2019). The polluter-pays principle (PPP) is 
one of the main principles of Environmental Law that tackles this issue, on the basis 
that as long as polluting does not have an attached cost to it, polluting will never 
stop. 
The foundations of the relationship between humanity and the environment were 
first laid in during the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Environment 
in Stockholm (Sweden). The PPP was not featured in the Stockholm Declaration, 
but it was included in the Rio Declaration, adopted after the 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Its Principle 16 stated: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment. 
Before the Rio Declaration, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) issued the Recommendation of the Council on Guiding 
Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies 
of 26th May 1972, in which the PPP is mentioned for the first time. In the scope of 
the European Union (EU), the PPP is cited for the first time in the Recommendation 
of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle of 14th 
November 1974, as the EU included it in its first Environmental Action Program 
for the period 1973-1976. 
It was not until 1987 that it was included for the first time in a legally binding 
instrument, the then Treaty of the European Community, and today the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in its article 191(2):  
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Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles 
that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should 
as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
The main function of the PPP is “to internalise the social costs borne by the public 
authorities for pollution prevention and control” (De Sadeleer, 2012, p. 408). 
However, it should be understood in a much broader sense: it has a preventive 
function, as the polluter is expected to reduce pollution as soon as the costs of 
polluting become higher than the benefits from continuing polluting; a control 
function, since the costs of monitoring pollution are also paid by the polluter; a 
punitive function, for the costs of cleaning-up the environment from future damage; 
and a reparative function, to cover the clean-up costs of damage that has already 
taken place (Salassa Boix, 2016). 
Therefore, considering the case of carbon emissions, a case in which polluters have 
never born the full cost of polluting the environment, it is obvious that it is a field 
in which the PPP should find its application. Introducing carbon pricing, as a mean 
of incorporating the cost of the GHG emissions in the products of those generating 
them, is a mean of making the polluters pay. 
B. Types of carbon pricing policies 
Carbon pricing puts a price on carbon emissions to encourage their reduction and 
mitigate the effects of climate change. This tool is based on the economic and the 
legal grounds stated supra. However, carbon pricing is a broad term which 
encompasses two different mechanisms that allow to put that price on carbon 
emissions: emissions trading and carbon taxation. 
i. Emissions trading 
Emissions trading offers a more liberal approach to carbon pricing. With it, 
authorities do not set a price for the emissions of carbon but a cap on the aggregate 
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emissions level of a certain region. Therefore, it allows the market to determine the 
price of those emissions. To understand more intuitively how the mechanism works, 
we can study the graph below (Figure 3).  
Before the introduction of the cap-and-trade scheme and a cap on the emissions, the 
carbon emissions equilibrium is Q0, with a price of P0. Nevertheless, officials, based 
on environmental studies, perceive this equilibrium as undesired, as Q0 is over the 
maximal supply of pollution rights. Consequently, a cap is introduced, and the 
supply curve of carbon emissions becomes completely inelastic, as S* = Q1. In turn, 
setting this cap on the supply of carbon emissions changes the equilibrium price, 
reaching P1, which generally should be higher than the previous P0. 
Figure 3 
Effects of the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme through a supply and demand 
curve graph 
 
Note. The introduction of a cap in emissions automatically reduces the 
quantity of emissions (Q1). If demand remains unchanged, the 
unaccounted externality costs of carbon emissions are internalised in 
the price (P1).  
While this mechanism relies on the market to establish the new equilibrium price 
P1 after the cap is set, it is an effective system to reduce the pollution in our 
atmosphere. The cap on GHG establishes a solid limit on the emissions permitted 
for, ideally the whole economy, but normally, for given sectors, and as the limit 
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gets stricter over time, authorities can adapt to achieve their decarbonisation goals 
or pledges made towards the international community. 
The total amount of the cap is split into allowances, which permits the agent that 
possesses one of them to emit one tonne of carbon emissions. These allowances can 
be distributed among companies through auctions or for free. Nevertheless, since 
the cap is meant to be reduced over time and carbon prices are expected to increase, 
it provides economic agents with incentives to efficiently reduce their emissions, 
so that they are able to keep production costs low. 
Once companies have their allowances for a certain period, three different scenarios 
are possible: the possessed allowances might match the emissions emitted, and 
there would not be any problem; or they might not match, either because one is 
emitting a quantity of tonnes higher than the allowances they had allocated, either 
because the number of tonnes emitted is lower than the previously allocated. In 
these cases, the trade from the cap-and-trade comes into play. 
Agents, typically companies, have the possibility to resort to a carbon market to 
match their emissions and allowances. Cap-and-trade is a system favoured by many 
because it is considered that, not only companies are encouraged to comply with 
the allowances, but also inspires them to further reduce their emissions because they 
know that they have the possibility of selling the unused allowances and make a 
profit out of them (Zweifel et al., 2017).  
The improvements in technologies will be carried out by companies that consider 
the reduction of carbon emissions economically sensible (e.g., the profit of 
introducing improvements and selling the allowances is higher than continue 
emitting and using up the possessed allowances). The result of the cap-and-trade 
mechanism is the achievement of carbon emissions reduction with the minimum 
cost.  
However, there is an alternative to cap-and-trade as a carbon pricing policy to be 
able to include households, which also emit a considerable amount of carbon 
emissions through road transport and residential heating and are hard to include in 
cap-and-trade, and it is carbon taxation. 
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ii. Carbon taxation 
Carbon taxes are levies imposed generally on the burning of fossil fuels, aimed at 
reducing and eventually eliminating the use of these energy sources whose 
combustion is responsible for destabilising and destroying our climate. 
Governments can set a carbon tax in terms of monetary units per tonne of GHG 
emitted, or a tax in proportion to the carbon content of the three main fossil fuels 
(coal, petroleum, and natural gal) as they enter the economy (International 
Monetary Fund, 2012). 
The tax needs to be cost-effective, that is, it should cover all sources of carbon 
emissions, and it needs to be efficient, setting a tax price equal to the marginal cost 
of the reduction in emissions (Murray and Rivers, 2015). It is also important that, 
over time, the carbon tax increases, as the more GHG accumulate in the atmosphere, 
the greater the incremental damage of one more tonne of CO2 is. The effects of a 
carbon tax on the demand and supply curves are seen below in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 
Effects of the introduction of a carbon tax through a supply and demand curve 
graph 
 
Note. The introduction of a carbon tax increases prices to the same 
extent of its value (P1), although not capping for carbon emissions. If 
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demand remains unchanged, the higher prices lead to lower emission 
levels (Q1). It is a case of upstream taxation (suppliers). 
The introduction of a tax, from a macroeconomic perspective, has different effects 
depending on whether it consists in upstream or downstream taxation. If it taxes 
refineries and importers of petroleum products, the supply curve is shifted to the 
left, as for the same price P, less carbon-intensive products will be offered. Whereas 
if final emitters are bearing the weight of the tax, the shock is on the demand curve, 
shifting it, therefore, to the left, as disposable incomes are affected and for the same 
price, less carbon-intensive goods will be acquired. In both cases, Q is reduced, 
going from Q0 to Q1, even if impacts in prices are different. Ideally, the tax should 
be applied upstream (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
The idea is that, just as in the cap-and-trade, the price of carbon-intensive goods, 
that is, the products intensive in those sources of energy, but also the fossil fuels 
themselves, raises, causing consumption to decrease. Therefore, carbon emissions 
are also expected to decrease, but without certainty on the extent of the reduction. 
As the tax gradually increases, it is also expected to lead to both overall energy 
savings and investments in energy-efficiency technologies, while switching 
consumption to goods that are less carbon-intensive, e.g., deciding to switch from 
a combustion-engine vehicle to hybrid or electrical options. 
As countries end up implementing a carbon tax, they attach a price to carbon 
emissions that rarely matches that of other countries (e.g., France introduced its 
carbon price in 2014 at EUR 7 per tonne of CO2, while Sweden’s was over EUR 
100 for the same year). A phasing of the tax, with the prevision of increases 
gradually, can be, nevertheless, a good strategy for enhancing acceptability of the 
tax. It offers an opportunity for households and companies to adapt to the tax, as 
prices of consumer goods adjust steadily to their carbon content and the economic 
agents have time to improve their consumption choices according to the new price 
signals. 
The average price for emissions worldwide is about USD 2 per tonne, which is 
certainly below of what is needed, but it does not need to be significantly much 
higher. The International Monetary Fund has calculated that a USD 35 per tonne 
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carbon tax might be sufficient for some countries to meet the Paris targets, although 
others need much higher prices (Parry, 2019).  
An ideal scenario for a carbon tax should be a global tax, as climate change is a 
global issue. It could either be a global tax collected by an international 
organisation, or a harmonised tax for all the countries. However, this is far from the 
current possibilities. Therefore, so far, there are only examples of national-level 
carbon taxes, although only a few, as countries are normally reluctant to adopt 
carbon taxation (Padilla and Roca, 2004).  
Besides the fact that adopting a tax is a difficult political decision, countries are 
concerned about the loss of competitiveness in international trade due to increased 
prices of carbon-intensive products affected by the tax (International Monetary 
Fund, 2012). Aside from the political obstacle that constitute firms fearing being 
outcompeted, the risk of carbon leakage, meaning the situation in which a company, 
due to the costs related to climate policies, decides to transfer production to laxer-
emission-constraints countries, also threatens the implementation of taxes at a 
national level (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012). 
However, there are mechanisms to ameliorate these problems, such as carbon 
border taxes, which levies imported products with a tax equivalent to the emissions 
that the domestic production of those would have generated (Roca, 2018). It is a 
difficult task yet introducing carbon border taxes would allow the implementation 
of a carbon tax. For instance, the EU is already in works to adopt an EU carbon 
border adjustment mechanism, complicated because it could fall into contradiction 
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements, but that would facilitate the 
implementation of carbon taxes among Member States.  
C. Advantages and disadvantages of emissions trading and 
carbon taxation 
Carbon pricing is essential to alter the behaviour of economic agents in order to 
reduce GHG emissions, and it can easily be perceived that both emissions trading 
and carbon taxing are effective means. Certain territories, such as the EU, have 
chosen the implementation of emissions trading schemes (ETS) over the 
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introduction of a general carbon tax across Member States, while other regions, 
such as Canada, France, or Sweden, opted for carbon taxation. Each option is valid 
yet offers different advantages and disadvantages. In this section, these will 
combinedly be assessed, as usually the weaknesses of one can be made up for with 
the other, and vice versa. 
In terms of achieving reduction targets, cap-and-trade is viewed by some, like the 
EC (2015) as “the best means of meeting a GHG reduction target at least overall 
cost to participants and the economy as a whole” (p. 5). In fact, the existence of a 
tax on carbon emissions might not guarantee that reduction target, if economic 
agents are still willing to pay its price and consider paying for the pollution more 
economically desirable than the introduction of low-carbon technologies in their 
production processes, or than the change in consumption patterns. With cap-and-
trade, there is, therefore, certainty about the quantity of GHG emissions. By setting 
a cap, compliance with reduction commitments is ensured, as long as important 
sanctions are expected by those exceeding it.  
On the price of emissions, another upside of the cap-and-trade before a carbon tax 
is that the possibility of trading should naturally set the right carbon price, as it is 
especially difficult to determine the right price of the tax for that cut in emissions 
to be produced, besides setting the adequate increase path for that tax. Setting a 
carbon price through a tax is risky, as it can lack sufficient theoretical basis, and 
affect unequally economic agents, under- or overcharging them. However, a carbon 
tax provides certainty about the marginal cost of complying with the emission 
reductions, which in cap-and-trade depends on a given market price, even though, 
as it was said earlier, left uncertainty about the economy-wide emission levels. 
While carbon pricing is mainly an economic tool to incentivise the behaviour of 
agents to reduce carbon emissions, one cannot forget about the extra revenue that 
they offer to collectors. Even if it should be kept in mind that carbon pricing is not 
exclusively aimed at increasing general budgets, and that revenues are expected to 
decrease for both policies in the long run (as emissions decrease and economies 




However, the revenue from a carbon tax is unlimited, as carbon emissions are not 
capped, and a carbon tax can be applied to tax both households and companies. In 
ETS, the revenue comes mainly from the initial actioning of the emissions 
allowances, which are gradually reduced, and only companies are normally subject 
to cap-and-trade, so the revenue is limited compared to carbon taxation. 
Furthermore, unlike international ETS, carbon taxes enable to keep the tax 
payments within the country (Green et al., 2007). 
Moreover, as a carbon tax is introduced by a country, in contrast to ETS, a wider 
catalogue of policy options is available for the adopters. Part of this revenue should 
be used to compensate the poorest households, for which bearing the burden of the 
tax is more arduous, to reassure that the carbon tax is as revenue neutral as possible. 
However, the remaining part is expected to go to the countries’ general budgets, 
and it can be used efficiently and transparently to secure the social acceptability of 
the carbon tax. For instance, to compensate revenue tax or corporate tax reductions. 
Its implementation should also be considered. A carbon tax could be easily 
implemented in most countries, as long as they have effective tax systems already 
in place, with monitoring and enforcement regimes to minimise tax evasion. Since 
monitoring can be done through the estimations of the emissions that would result 
from the combustion of the fossil fuels, the implementation would be 
straightforward. Pre-existing collection mechanisms at any territorial level could 
work for carbon taxes.  
The same cannot be said for ETS, as they require creating new trading markets on 
which emissions permits will be traded, with special regulations and specific 
institutions to supervise their functioning. For small regions, introducing an ETS is 
typically nor economically nor practically feasible, despite examples of ETS in 
territorial units smaller than a country, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative and California’s cap-and-trade program, in the Unites States (Calel and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2016). 
Likewise, in terms of creating incentives, putting a price on carbon emissions 
through a carbon tax that levies the consumption of fuel can be more effective than 
the existence of an ETS. As prices of fuel increase through a tax, the rise in prices 
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would spread more widely all thorough the economy, increasing prices of 
consumption goods other than strictly energy-related products.  
On one side, consumers would be more incentivised to buy local products, to 
change their means of transport, to insulate better their homes or to care more about 
the energy efficiency of their domestic appliances, to save up money on 
consumption. On the other, manufacturers would be encouraged to opt for more 
efficient technologies, to reduce costs of production and continue to offer 
competitive prices in the market. 
In any case, since it is called carbon pricing, the price is the most delicate issue. 
Going back to it, a carbon tax also offers an opportunity to price carbon in a stable 
way. As records from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) 
market have shown, the carbon price in these markets can fluctuate easily. The 
volatility has been affected by factors such as the distribution of free allowances or 
the future expectations on the market being short. On the other hand, a carbon tax 
not only would offer predictability on the carbon price for economic agents, as it 
was seen earlier, but stronger price signals (Green et al., 2007). 
The summary of this section is, therefore, that while both ETS and carbon taxes are 
useful carbon pricing techniques, the advantages of carbon taxes are considered to 
outweigh those of the difficult-to-implement ETS. Some authors consider that 
relying on the market to reduce carbon emissions through an ETS to solve the 
market failure that constitutes climate change “would be the triumph of hope over 
experience” (Andrew, 2008, p. 393). 
Above all, general optimism about the future implementation of carbon taxes 
worldwide, rather than ETS, relies on another fact: countries general budget 
outlooks in the long-term are not the greatest and new fiscal measures will need to 
be introduced eventually to make up for greater expenses. The introduction of a 
carbon tax justifying it in the need to cut emissions to meet reduction targets will 
be easier to accept that any other increase in current taxes directly affecting 
households and companies, but it will nevertheless be useful to easily increase 
national tax incomes. 
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D. Current development of carbon pricing policies worldwide 
In the world today, one can find examples for both cap-and-trade and carbon taxes, 
implemented in different countries or regions as carbon pricing mechanisms. Along 
the following pages, European examples for both mechanisms will be reviewed, to 
see how the theoretical principles behind carbon pricing seen above are applied in 
the real life.  
Regarding cap-and-trade, this theoretical model has also been put in practise, being 
the EU-ETS the most noteworthy experience. It caps the total volume of GHG 
emissions from certain installations and aircraft operators that are responsible for 
approximately 50% of the EU GHG emissions, covering over 11,000 power stations 
and industrial plants in 31 countries, and flights between airports from participating 
countries (EC, 2015). 
In 1997, after the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, the EU-ETS started to take shape. As 
the Protocol set legally binding GHG reduction targets, the EU needed new policy 
instruments to meet these commitments. Accordingly, the EU adopted the Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 October 2003, 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community. 
It proposed the implementation of the cap-and-trade scheme through the division 
into distinct trading periods over time, also known as phases, to ensure correct 
functioning of the ETS. The first phase, which ran from 2005 to 2007, was the pilot 
phase, used to test price formation in the carbon market and to observe which was 
the necessary infrastructure. The second phase ran from 2008 to 2012, which 
overlapped with the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and with 
the expansion by the inclusion of the aviation sector as the most remarkable 
benchmark. A third phase ran from 2013 to 2020, which was shaped by the lessons 
learnt from the previous two phases. Up from January 2021, a fourth phase was 
introduced, with the most stringent caps so far, resulting in the carbon prices in the 
EU-ETS hitting new all-time highs (S&P Global, 2021). 
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A remarkable irregularity took place from mid-2006 until the end of the first phase, 
where prices dropped to EUR 0 per tonne (Figure 5). Until April 2006, market 
participants had the belief that the market would be short at the end, meaning 
companies would have to pay a penalty if they could not come up with enough 
emission rights. Yet this was not the case, as emissions in 2005 were lower than the 
allowances, and the European Commission announced that these could be used until 
the end of the first phase, so overallocation of permits led to prices going down 
(Green et al., 2007). This irregularity shows that cap expectations for market 
participants are relevant in terms of price formation. 
Figure 5 
Evolution of the carbon price in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 
in euros/tCO2 
 
Note. Despite the earlier irregularities in the carbon price formation, 
particularly the drop around after 2006, in the last few years the price 
has grown sufficiently to consider the stringent caps on emissions 
fulfilling their goal. Source: Reuters (2020). 
Expert opinions on the effectiveness of this cap-and-trade system vastly differ. One 
of the aspects that is debated about the EU-ETS is whether it effectively fulfils its 
function of signalling on emitters the need of reducing carbon emissions. As seen 
from the historic prices (Figure 5), the market has not been able to ensure carbon 
prices were high enough to force energy generation from coal out of the market for 
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most of its existence. However, other economists remind that the EU-ETS’s main 
purpose was to reach ambitious reductions on emissions at the lowest cost, and 
since targets have been met, the system can be characterised as rather successful 
(Ma, 2013). 
For this mechanism to continue functioning well, it is necessary that the principle 
of capping remains respected. Moreover, if authorities wish for a higher CO2 price, 
they should send signals to the market making agents believe that the market will 
be short on allowances by the end of the then-current trading period, namely, 
through the introduction of more ambitious targets (Friedrich et al., 2019).  
While cap-and-trade is effective to reduce carbon emissions, it is difficult to 
implement at an only national level, since the infrastructure behind these schemes 
is nor simple nor cheap. That is one of the reasons why the EU, with an international 
dimension, could opt for it. When it comes to cut down emissions at a national level, 
countries normally choose carbon taxes. Even in Europe, where the EU-ETS is in 
force, Member States have introduced several carbon taxes, as the carbon emissions 
covered by the EU-ETS only account for around 50% of the total EU emissions, 
and Europe aims to be an economy with net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 
(International Monetary Fund, 2020).  
The forerunners of carbon taxing in Europe are, as usually happens with 
environmental issues, the Nordic countries. In 1990, Finland became the first 
country in the world to introduce a carbon tax. Despite its low carbon price, only 
EUR 1.12 per tonne of CO2, it still became the first to adopt fiscal measures to 
attempt to reduce carbon emissions as a mean of mitigating climate change, even 
before the celebration of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, where the issue of global 
warming started to become a serious subject (Nachmany et al., 2015). 
Still, one of the most famous cases of success in the implementation of a carbon tax 
is the case of Sweden. It was introduced for the first time in 1991, pricing carbon 
emissions at around EUR 24 per tonne, and it gradually increased until a price for 
emissions in 2021 close to EUR 114 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021), being 
currently one of the highest carbon taxes in the world (Andersson, 2019). Economic 
growth has generally been linked with increased GHG emissions. Yet the success 
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of this case comes from the fact that Sweden has been able to combine a reduction 
on GHG emissions with economic growth, as during the 1990-2013 period, the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 61% but emissions shrank by 23% 
(Åkerfeldt and Hammar, 2015).  
What is even more interesting is the stability of the tax during the experience of the 
last 30 years, merged with lack of significant public opposition, without the 
revenues generated by the carbon tax affected to particular climate purposes, 
contributing directly to the Swedish general budget (Government Offices of 
Sweden, 2021). According to them, the key factors that supported public acceptance 
were general environmental concerns, both from households and firms; broad 
political consensus as to ensure stability through government changes; ensuring that 
other feasible alternatives are possible, such as biofuels, public transport, or housing 
insulation mechanisms; and a step-by-step approach with limited exemptions or tax 
reductions for certain economic sectors (Sweden’s Ministry of Finance, 2021).  
The case of Sweden, even if it has not been without critics (Jonsson et al., 2020), 
can therefore be a good example for other countries to effectively implement a 
carbon tax, at least in terms of stability in the tax system. While most EU countries 
tax carbon emissions to some extent, not many do it by an officially called carbon 
tax. Other “carbon taxes” are established without directly affecting carbon 
emissions. Namely, Catalonia’s regional “carbon tax”, created by the Llei 5/2017, 
de 28 de març, which levies the fact of owning a vehicle that has the potential of 
generating carbon emissions, but not the emissions themselves (Article 85). 
Therefore, the objective of carbon taxes, which is reducing carbon emissions in a 
certain territory, is not fulfilled in this case. 
In conclusion, successful carbon taxes examples provide evidence of their 
suitability to be implemented by countries as a mean of reducing carbon emissions, 
ensuring a price stability that is rarely seen in ETS, and can be adopted more easily 
than a ETS framework. However, since taxes are not normally welcome by those 
affected by them, the tasks in communicating them effectively are just as important 
as those dealing with the well-design of the tax.  
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IV. France as a case study of carbon pricing 
Once this point has been reached, it is clear that climate change mitigation should 
be the most preferred approach to deal with nowadays anthropogenic global 
warming. Moreover, carbon pricing is the most adequate technique to effectively 
reduce carbon emissions, regardless of whether cap-and-trade or carbon taxation 
are used, despite the latest being more favoured. 
To study how carbon pricing is adjusted to reality when implemented in a territory, 
the case of France will be assessed. Firstly, because it is a country that has adopted 
both cap-and-trade and carbon taxation as means to achieve a reduction in GHG 
emissions, through the subjection of part of the French companies to the EU-ETS, 
and through the introduction of a carbon tax in France’s tax mix addressing 
explicitly carbon emissions. Secondly, because it is interesting to see how they 
evolved, as they both experienced important gaps in terms of the price of carbon 
emissions. 
As merging both mechanisms can be particularly delicate because the subjects 
subject to each pricing mechanism are different, and the level of emissions is in fact 
dissimilar, each carbon pricing mechanism in France will be studied through two 
different methods, linking carbon emission reductions with carbon price evolution. 
Data for the EU-ETS dates as far back as for its creation in 2005, but for the French 
carbon tax only since its establishment in 2014. Therefore, for the first, the study 
will be focussed on the analysis of past data for the period 2005-2020, and for the 
carbon tax, on the analysis of data for the period 2010-2019, to see if there is any 
difference between the ex-ante and ex-post levels of emissions. 
A. Country profile 
Before the analysis of the carbon pricing mechanisms in France, it is advisable to 
assess how the carbon emissions profile of the country is. Despite it not being 
strictly necessary to proceed with the statistical evaluation of emissions, it can 
provide insights into the generation of emissions by sector and explain some of the 
results found later.  
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In terms of historical CO2 emissions, France has shared the same path of developed 
countries (Figure 6), exacerbated by the fact that France has taken part in most of 
the important occurrences of the last two centuries: while France experienced an 
early industrialisation in the 19th century, it was also involved in both the First 
(1914-1918) and Second (1939-1945) World Wars, and it was affected by other 
events, such as the Great Depression of 1929, and the Oil Crisis of 1973. During 
those incidents, emissions dropped, due to the economic recessions. 
Figure 6 
Evolution of France’s CO2 emissions by fuel source since 1750, in million tonnes 
 
Note. The graph shows for France the exponential increase in CO2 
emissions during the second half of the 20th century, leaving behind the 
economic losses from both the World Wars and the Great Depression. 
Source: Our world in Data. 
France is also one of the biggest, in terms of population, and one of the wealthiest, 
in terms of GDP, countries in the European Union. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that it is one of the highest emitters of GHG among Member States in absolute 




Evolution of emissions for the highest GHG emitters in the EU since 2008, in 
million tonnes 
 
Note. France only falls behind Germany –by far, the highest GHG 
emitter in the EU–, the United Kingdom (Member State until 2020), 
and Poland. Source: Eurostat. 
Despite its population and GDP, France is tied up on emissions with countries, such 
as Italy or Poland, with fewer habitants and lower GDPs. This is possible due to the 
type of energy mix France enjoys of. While renewable energy sources only account 
for around 15% of the total energy generation, nuclear energy generates over 70% 
of the total electricity supply in France. In fact, it is the second most nuclear country 
in the world, falling just behind the United States, and nuclear energy is a low-
carbon source of energy, so the energy sector is already quite decarbonised, in 
comparison with neighbouring countries. 
This is also reflected when analysing France’s CO2 emissions per sector (Figure 8), 
as emissions from energy transformation are lower than those of residential sources, 
mainly coming from households, or road transport, which still rely largely on fossil 
fuels, emissions which are more difficult to reduce. However, the reduction of CO2 
46 
 
emissions in the manufacturing sector during the last few decades is remarkable, as 
it might hint the efforts of industries to decarbonise their production processes. 
Figure 8 
GHG emissions per sector in France since 1990, expressed in million metric tonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalents (Mt CO2e) 
 
Note. Despite overall lowering of GHG emissions during the last few 
decades, the residential sector, agriculture, and road transport have not 
shown any relevant changes in terms of emissions. Source: Institut 
national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) (2021). 
The tendency on the gradual fall of emissions reflects the fears of a country that has 
long been concerned about the environment. In fact, the earliest project of a fiscal 
instrument to mitigate climate change dates as early as 1990 (Laurent and Le 
Cacheux, 2009). It has had since 2004 an Environment Charter (Charte de 
l’Environnement), with constitutional value. With regard to other regulations, the 
Environmental Code (Code de l’Environnement), in its Article L 110-1 II 3, 
includes the PPP, in the following terms:  
[The protection, enhancement, preservation of the environment] are 
inspired, within the framework of the laws which define its scope, by the 
following principles: [...] The polluter pays principle, according to which 
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the costs resulting from pollution prevention, reduction and control 
measures must be borne by the polluter. 
Within the scope of application of the PPP, environmental taxes have found its role 
as means of making the polluters pay for their damages. In fact, the revenues of 
these, applied on transport, pollution, and energy, have experienced an important 
increase during the last decade, especially energy taxes, which have nearly doubled 
compared to the 1990s revenues (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 
France’s environmental tax revenues, for the 1995-2019 period, in million euros 
 
Note. An important increase is seen after the year 2015, which coincides 
with the introduction of a significantly higher price on the carbon tax. 
Source: Eurostat. 
All domestic energy taxes are considered environmental taxes in statistics, even 
though for France, only the carbon tax, as a part of the energy taxes, aims at 
reducing CO2 emissions (Gloriant, 2018). While only the revenue from a carbon 
tax, not the EU-ETS, would be reflected in Figure 9, France has experience both 
with emissions trading and carbon taxation, within a climate policy framework, 
aiming at decarbonising electricity generation.  
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The country is currently employing the EU-ETS, in place since 2005 and covering 
75% of total French industrial emissions, and a carbon tax on fossil fuel 
consumption, in place since 2014 and now amounting at around EUR 45 per tonne 
(Dussaux, 2020). In the next sections, both mechanisms will be described and will 
be analysed in the terms established earlier in this section. 
B. French companies in the EU-ETS  
The EU-ETS, as a cap-and-trade emissions market was briefly explained in Chapter 
III. France, since it is an EU Member State, also has some of its companies subject 
to the EU-ETS. Therefore, some of the French CO2 emissions were partly covered 
by a carbon price long before the introduction of a carbon tax in 2014 within the 
French borders. An important feature of these emissions is that, for most of the time 
that the ETS has been in place, the top five highest French emitters essentially 
implied around half of the covered emissions, as it can be seen in the figures below. 
Moreover, emissions covered from electricity generation sources are lower than the 
European average, due to the important role of nuclear in France. 
Figure 10 
Top five highest emitting French companies for Phase 1 (2005-2007) 
 
Note. For each company, the weight is expressed in percentage over the 














Top five highest emitting French companies for Phase 2 (2008-2012) 
 
Note. As more companies are included in the EU-ETS during the Phase 
2, the relative weight of the highest emitters is reduced, but companies 
remain the same. Source: EU transaction log (EC). 
Figure 12 
Top five highest emitting French companies for Phase 3 (only 2013-2015) 
 
Note. Again, the relative weight of the highest emitters is reduced, 
Engie pushes out LafargeHolcim from the top five, but emissions 





















i. Analysis of the effects of the EU-ETS in France 
In this section, we will attempt to analyse if the EU-ETS carbon price triggered any 
significant effects on the emissions for the eight highest emitting French companies, 
for which we have the yearly verified emissions for the period 2005-2020. This self-
constructed data base merges the different installations of each company, for which 
yearly emissions are available in the EU Transaction Log of the EC. That is, for 
Électricité de France (EDF), it merges all the installations for which the Account 
Holder Name is “EDF SA”, and so on for each of the eight companies. 
These eight companies are, besides EDF, Total, the oil and gas multinational 
company; ExxonMobil, another oil and gas multinational; Ciments Calcia, a French 
company specialised in the concrete sector; LafargeHolcim, a building materials 
multinational manufacturer; the electric utility multinational Engie; GazelEnergie, 
the third largest energy producer in France; and AcelorMittal, the multinational 
steel manufacturing company. As a matter of fact, the eight companies belong to 
sectors notorious for their carbon-intense production processes. 
While there was already consolidated data for these companies for Phases 1 & 2 
from reports released after the evaluation of these, we consider a trading period of 
eight years (2005 – 2012) not long enough to appreciate effects on emissions, 
particularly considering that it coincides with a very volatile period for the carbon 
price in the EU-ETS market. Using a trading period of sixteen years, therefore, 
includes data from all the three Phases that took place before the introduction of the 
fourth in 2021, and is more likely to provide interesting insights for our research. 
As available data for emissions is disclosed in yearly intervals, but data for the EU-
ETS carbon price is available for each trading day, our model uses the median 
yearly price for each year, to assess if there is any relationship between the trend on 
the price evolution and on the reduction of emissions, despite the oversimplification 
of this technique.  
It also uses the median, instead of the yearly mean, to avoid outlier effects (e.g., an 
observation that represents an anomaly to the trend) on the price, which normally 
appear in financial markets. More accurately, in spite of outlier effects affecting the 
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median, this is less liable to be distorted by outliers than the mean average. Future 
works will be advised on working with more specific periods of time for emissions, 
such as months, but also studying a longer period of time, that partly includes Phase 
4, in which prices are expected to reach the highest levels since the introduction of 
the EU-ETS. 
Figure 13 





Note. Despite sharing the “highest emitting French companies” title for 
absolute emission values, each shows a different trend on emissions, 
some decreasing, increasing, or remaining unchanged for the period of 
time examined. Source: EU transaction log (EC). 
For our statistical model, our null hypothesis is there is no correlation between 
emissions emitted by a company and the price of the EU-ETS. The alternative 
hypothesis is there is correlation between the emissions of each company and the 
market carbon price. If we rejected the null hypothesis, it would imply there is some 
sort of relationship between the emissions of a given company and the carbon price 
set by the EU-ETS. As Figure 13 shows, a general overview of each company’s 
emissions is not conclusive to assess any relationship, so we must proceed to carry 
out our model.  
Using RStudio, we carry out a linear mixed model (LMM) as a method to analyse 
our data, which is considered to be non-independent or hierarchical, correlation 
which arises from the fact that each company has its own structure and is only 
capable of modifying their total carbon emissions to a certain extent. Since this 
hierarchical structure of our data is able to negatively affect the results of a simple 
linear model, we could either run individual regressions for each company, or 
aggregate our data taking averages, but both options would either be too noisy, or 
not take full advantage of having data for the eight different companies. 
An LMM, as an extension of simple linear models, allows the incorporation of fixed 
and random effects, and in our case, lets us remove from the model the intrinsic 
variability for each company. Moreover, we apply a log transformation on 
emissions to make our data distribution less skewed. We use a significance level of 
0.05, which indicates there is a 5% risk of concluding that the price effect on 
emissions exists when there is no actual effect. 
The model specification was as follows: log(Emissions) ~ b0 + b1 * Price + 
(1|Company). The results from the LMM show there were significant effects of the 
EU-ETS price on carbon emissions for companies for a significance level of 5% 
(b1 = - 0.013322, t(95) = - 2.13721, p = 0.0351). It shows that there is an inverse 
correlation between EU-ETS carbon price, and the tonnes of CO2 emitted by these 
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companies subject to the EU cap-and-trade scheme. Therefore, the interpretation is 
that for every 1-unit increase in the Price variable, the log(Emissions) variable 
decreases by the beta coefficient value, that is, 0.013322. 
Figure 14 





Note. While for most companies an increase in the carbon price leads 
to a decrease in the emissions, for others, such as Ciments Calcia or 
Lafarge Holcim emissions do not only not decrease, but increase. 
Consequently, we might interfere from our model the existence of a price signal on 
emissions in the EU-ETS. If we attempted to study this for each company, the 
interference would be difficult to stop (Figure 14), just like if we only took a look 
at the trend on the carbon price (Figure 15). To effectively signal the negative 
externalities of carbon emissions, the price path should have followed a gradual 
increase for most of the life of the EU-ETS, which has not been the case. 
Figure 15 
Trend on EU-ETS price between April 2008 – April 2021 
 
Note. An adequate price signal would have avoided the downfall in the 
price during the first two phases. Source:  
Our conclusions for the analysis of the EU-ETS and the emissions of the 
aforementioned French companies are that, in spite of our findings, which have 
shown there is a significant relationship between the EU-ETS carbon price and the 
emissions, these should be handled carefully. Especially, after studying the 
evolution of the price for the period 2008 – 2013, in which the market carbon price 
did not only not increase to signal companies to reduce emissions, as an undesired 
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output of their production processes, but it did indeed decrease, which does not 
make economic sense in such an environmental fiscal tool. 
It is more than possible that companies decreased emissions due to other reasons, 
such as stronger national regulations, the wish to becoming certified by a certain 
ISO (accreditations awarded by the International Organization for Standardization 
which ensure certain standards of quality, among others), or just to improve their 
image in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in face of the general 
population; not because they were specifically responding to a EU-ETS carbon 
price increase. However, it might be due to the price. We should interfere this from 
a more in-depth analysis of each company, which is not carried out in our study. 
To complement our conclusions on the effects of the EU-ETS carbon price in the 
French industrial sector, it is interesting to remark that an OECD study of 2020 on 
the effects of energy prices and carbon taxes on environmental and economic 
performance found that, in the case of France, increased energy prices through the 
inclusion of carbon pricing not only did not lead to an industry level loss of full-
time employees, but it effectively led to a reduction of energy use and a decrease in 
carbon emissions (Dussaux, 2020). Therefore, at a general industry level, the carbon 
price and emissions share the inverse correlation found in our model. 
In any case, this market carbon price must be put next to the carbon price that the 
national French tax sets, which currently shares a similar price (of around EUR 45 
per tonne of CO2), but this has not been the case for most of the experience with 
the European cap-and-trade mechanism. It is important to remember, when 
studying that, that, as stated by the OECD (2018), in 2015, France priced four fifths 
of industry emissions at effective carbon rates below EUR 30, which is very low. 
Not only that, but for most of the earliest years of the EU-ETS, allowances were 
handed in for free, so it is not actually fair to say French companies started paying 
for their carbon emissions as early as in 2005. 
As a final conclusion, we consider that the inclusion of a border tax should have 
been proposed in the earliest steps of the ETS to avoid the price signal inefficiencies 
in the first years. Allowances would have not been handed in for free for nearly ten 
years for the companies that risked losing competitivity, which happened to be the 
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highest emitters, and they would have been more solidly encouraged to reduce 
emissions. The pretext of protecting European industries from untaxed industries 
abroad is, in part, fair, and it is understandable since no one wishes to bear extra 
costs when others around you are not facing them, but, sadly, making them pay for 
their emissions with an appropriate carbon price as soon as possible is necessary 
only on the pretext of protecting our environment. 
C. Carbon taxation in France 
Carbon taxation is an alternative to price carbon when the implementation of an 
emissions trading scheme appears to be difficult, and it is one of the pillars needed 
to transition to low-carbon economies. As it was reviewed in Chapter III, the ideal 
situation for an effective pricing of carbon emissions would be an international 
harmonised carbon tax, so countries would not postpone the implementation of one 
due to local opposition from, not only households, but also from companies that 
fear a loss of competitivity when competing with untaxed products from abroad. 
However, since it seems difficult to achieve this kind of international agreement, 
some countries do not wait for this to happen to create a national-scoped tax on 
carbon. 
France is not the only country in the EU with a tax on carbon emissions, nor the 
first. Nordic countries already started experimenting with them in the 1990s, 
whereas the earliest French attempt dates from the year 2000. Nevertheless, it is an 
interesting case due to the struggles France had to face to finally be able to 
implement it in 2014. Some of the issues with carbon taxes come from the creation 
of exemptions for companies, to protect their competitivity in the international field, 
or because they are already subjected to an ETS, as in the case of France. 
In this section, firstly, the cases of the Ecotax (2000) and the Carbon Contribution 
(2009) will be reviewed, as they display these struggles in the history of France and 
carbon pricing. Both cases share the same faith: the invalidation of the projects by 
the Conseil Constitutionnel, France’s constitutional court. Following this, the 
current Climate-Energy Contribution (2014) will be presented, and our analysis will 
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attempt to assess the effects of the price on emissions for the period 2010-2019, to 
establish a difference between emissions before the introduction of the tax, and after 
the implementation, for total French emissions, and particularly, for the road 
transport sector, which we consider to be more sensible to increases in fuel prices.   
i. Previous carbon tax attempts 
The Ecotax (2000) is the first French tentative to introduce carbon taxation in the 
national economy, under the influence of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997, the first international agreement setting legally binding targets on carbon 
reductions. 
In the aftermath of the Rio Earth Summit, the EU attempted in 1992 to introduce a 
harmonised tax on fossil fuels, according to the carbon emissions associated with 
their use, which would have established a minimum tax rate level for each fossil 
fuel across Member States. However, this initiative was hindered by the opposition 
of some governments. In 1995, a new shot was given to harmonise taxes on fossil 
fuels, with more flexible conditions, but it was rejected once again (Padilla and 
Roca, 2004). These two failed attempts showed that if measures were to be taken 
to reduce carbon emissions through taxing carbon, they would have to be taken by 
each Member State independently. 
France already had around fifty taxes related, to some extent, to the environment, 
but the framework lacked coherence and it did not express its wish to protect the 
environment (Bricq, 1999). In 1999, the government adopted the Taxe Générale sur 
les Activités Polluantes (TGAP), in force from the 1st of January 2000, to make the 
tax system in France more coherent. However, fearing that current policies would 
not work to achieve the GHG emissions reduction commitments, authorities aimed 
to extend the scope of TGAP to the energy sector, naming this extension the Ecotax. 
It affected intermediate fossil fuel energy (from natural gas and coal, heavy fuel oil, 
heating oil and liquefied petroleum gas) and electricity consumption. 
Two main factors, in the preparation of the tax, set the Ecotax to failure. Firstly, the 
lack of adequate communication of the aim of the tax. Part of the allocation of the 
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Ecotax revenues was meant to compensate the diminution of social security 
contributions due to the newly stablished 35-hour workweek. Therefore, the 
message sent to the citizens did not correspond to the initial goal of the tax: what 
was thought to be a measure to protect the environment seemed to be another way 
to increase tax collection in France (Rocamora, 2017). 
Secondly, the wide range of tax exemptions recognised in the bill. Since the process 
of negotiation of the Ecotax started, the proposal led to many economic actors 
opposing to the measure. In the end, to make sure the tax would be socially 
accepted, a threshold of 100 tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) of energy product per 
year was set, below which taxpayers were not subject to the Ecotax, which virtually 
exempted households from the tax. Moreover, while it seemed to leave the tax 
burden to companies only, due to the social negotiations, many other exemptions 
were included. The most remarkable, the existence of an abatement coefficient that 
increased progressively with energy consumption (Rocamora, 2017). 
These factors led to social and political opposition, which sent the Ecotax to be 
examined by the French Conseil Constitutionnel. In the Décision n° 2000-441 DC 
du 28 décembre 2000, the Conseil Constitutionnel appreciated two incoherencies 
between the tax structure and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ecotax, which 
stated that its objective was to reinforce the fight against GHG emissions, inciting 
companies to improve the consumption patterns on energy products.  
Regarding the abatement coefficients, these “could lead to a company being taxed 
more heavily than a similar company, even though it would have contributed less 
to the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere” (section 36). Concerning 
electricity taxation, it remarked that it was planned “even though due to the nature 
of the sources of electricity production in France, the consumption of electricity 
contributes very little to the release of carbon dioxide” (section 37). In the end, the 
Conseil considered that the Ecotax vulnerated the principle of equity in taxation and 
that it had to be considered against the Constitution. 
A new attempt to create a carbon tax took place with the Carbon Contribution 
(2009), the result of a pledge during the presidential campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy. 
The adoption of a carbon tax was contemplated within the environmental agenda 
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created with the Grenelle de l’Environnement, an open multi-party discussion that 
brought together representatives of the local and national government, and 
employers, labour unions and non-governmental organisations (NGO), with the 
goal of unifying a position on the environmental field (Boy, 2010).  
Along with the campaign pledge, the carbon tax was meant to be the specific tool 
needed to achieve the domestic (e.g., the Factor 4 objective, a reduction of CO2 
emissions by a factor of four by 2050) (Henriet et al., 2014) and international 
commitments (e.g., the EU target on the Kyoto Protocol and the target agreed on 
the L’Aquila summit, within the G8 framework) on reduction targets. 
The project of 2009 aimed at amending the mistakes of the carbon tax of 2000. To 
achieve unanimous consensus among stakeholders, a series of expert reports were 
presented. They concluded the need of the carbon tax to spur change in the 
behaviour of economic actors (Landau, 2007). Moreover, that the price should start 
at around EUR 32 per ton of CO2 and should progressively increase (Quinet, 2009), 
to ensure social acceptability, and that the major principles for the effective price 
signal were predictability (spanning over the long term), progressiveness (increase 
over time), additionality (differentiating from other existent taxes) and 
environmentality (designing the tax according to its objective of reducing CO2 
emissions) (Rocard, 2009).  
Despite the efforts in the preparation of this second carbon tax, the government 
failed at communicating the benefits of the carbon tax, the public were worried 
about whether the tax would be neutral because compensation mechanisms for 
households and companies were not clear, and the carbon tax was seen as another 
fiscal burden, which was not welcomely received by a country affected by an 
economic crisis. 
The carbon tax was finally adopted in the Loi de Finances pour 2010 but with a 
price of EUR 17 per ton. It did not include a pluriannual plan for its increase and it 
only targeted the consumption of fossil fuels, leaving electricity out. The problem 
with this second attempt was again the inclusion of numerous exemptions. 
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On the one hand, industrial installations that were already under the EU-ETS 
regime, and those awaiting their inclusion in the following phases, enjoyed of total 
exemptions. On the other hand, non-industrial sectors (e.g., agriculture, fisheries, 
public transport) that, according to the government, risked losing competitivity or 
were deemed to already making up for their GHG emissions under other policies, 
were benefited with exemptions and reduced targets (Rocamora, 2017). The real 
impact of the carbon tax was to increase the prices of fuel and gas for housing and 
office heating, and for transportation.  
Opposition led to bringing the tax before the Conseil Constitutionnel again. In the 
Décision n° 2009-599 DC du 29 décembre 2009, the Conseil stated again that even 
if “the objective of the carbon contribution [was] to "put in place instruments 
allowing a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions"”, the exemption 
regime lacked coherence. It remarked that while some companies were exempted 
from paying because of submission to the EU-ETS, “the paid quota regime [would] 
only come into force in 2013 and [would] do so gradually until 2027”, the 
allowances being in that moment handed in for free. Therefore, the tax only levied 
fossil fuels and other heating products, which entailed only a fraction of the carbon 
emissions.  
The Conseil considered that “by their importance, the total exemption regimes […] 
[were] contrary to the objective of combating global warming and create[d] a 
marked breach of equality before public charges”, therefore, it appreciated the 
unconstitutionality of the contribution, due to the inefficiency of its environmental 
incentive. As an example of this inequality, the carbon contribution would have 
taxed more heavily road transport than aviation, a sector that was excluded from 
the tax, whose inclusion in the EU-ETS was not envisaged at least before 2013, and 
which is a higher CO2 emitter in terms of tonne/transported kms or passengers/km 
transported; therefore, the price signal to reduce emissions would have been 
inexistant (Sainteny, 2010). 
After this, a new carbon tax project was initiated in 2010, but it was finally 
abandoned, and the climate agenda was finally being put aside, fearing to run again 
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against the opposition from households and to undermine French companies’ 
competitiveness (Callonnec et al., 2012). 
These are the short-lived stories of the first two attempts to introduce a carbon tax 
in France, describing in which context they were proposed, their goals, the structure 
of the taxes and the reasons why they did not succeed.  
ii. The Climate-Energy Contribution (2014 – at present) 
Climate policies were put on the table again with the rise of the Socialist Party in 
the presidential elections of May 2012. The first idea was to create the Climate-
Energy Contribution (CCE) as a new tax that would not only tax carbon-emitting 
actions, but also energy consumption, excluding renewable energies. In the end, the 
government proposed a CEE that would not be a new tax, but an increase in the 
already existent Taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques 
(TICPE), a tax on the consumption of energy products. 
During the development of the project, the Ministry had the support of a Committee 
for Ecological Taxation that, in July 2013, published a report in which it insisted on 
the importance of adopting a wide tax coverage, with as little exemptions as 
possible, and balanced by an appropriate compensation system, for households and 
companies. 
With the backing of the report, fourteen years after the first attempt to introduce 
carbon pricing in France, the CCE was finally included in the Loi de Finances pour 
2014. As suggested by the report, it was a carbon component in the existing energy 
taxes, the TICPE being the most important, but also in the Taxe Intérieure de 
Consommation sur le Gaz Naturel (TICGN) and the Taxe intérieure de 
consommation sur le charbon (TICC) (Chiroleu-Assouline, 2015). Furthermore, in 
order to allow exemptions while avoiding the infringement of the principle of tax 
equality, the CEE was not defined as an environmental tax (Rogissart et al., 2018). 
The tax established a carbon price of EUR 7/tCO2 in 2014, EUR 14.5/tCO2 in 2015 
and EUR 22/tCO2 in 2016, as the Ministry manifested (2014). This carbon 
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component was not explicit for energy buyers; instead, it was calculated by the 
customs service, therefore, through upstream taxation (Gloriant, 2018).  
In August 2015, the Parliament adopted the Loi n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 
relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte (LTECV). This act 
included many important environmental targets to be achieved by France in the 
following years and decades. Among others, a reduction of 40% in GHG emissions 
by 2030, and 75% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels; a reduction on the 
consumption of energy, by 20% in 2030, and 50% in 2050; increasing the share of 
renewable energies in France’s energy mix, up to a 32% in 2030; or reducing the 
one of nuclear, from 75% to 50%, in 2025. 
Aside from these, the LTECV also established new targets for the price of carbon 
in the CCE, of EUR 56/tCO2 in 2020, and EUR 100/tCO2 in 2030. Furthermore, 
the same act was amended in December of the same year, driven by the effects of 
the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, to set the prices for the period 
2017-2019: EUR 30.50/tCO2 in 2017, EUR 39/tCO2 in 2018 and EUR 47.50/tCO2 
in 2019. Hence, the inclusion of a carbon tax price for 2030 is important, not only 
in terms of a long-term perspective of the tax, but also because the carbon tax is 
linked with the broader climate change mitigation targets of the country. However, 
the effective increase in the tax required each Finance Act to annually adopt the 
increase.  
Table 1 
Initially planned progression of the carbon price in the CEE after 2014 (in 
euros/tCO2) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2030 
Carbon price 7 14,5 22 30,5 39 47,5 56 100 
Augmentation 
(compared to the 
previous year) 
+7 +7,5 +7,5 +8,5 +8,5 +8,5 +8,5 - 
Note. Between 2014 and 2015, the prices for the carbon tax were 
initially planned to increase following the trend on the table. Increases 
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for the period 2021-2030 were left for future approval. Source: Luche 
(2017). 
The first years of the CCE went by without major incidents or great opposition, 
unlike the two previous attempts. The increase of the tax until 2017, which 
essentially quadrupled the carbon price, from EUR 7 to EUR 30, went unnoticed, 
or at least, no public opposition raised against it.  
An important factor that contributed to public acceptance was a concomitant steady 
decline of the oil price over the last few years, as the price increase in fuels was 
deemed bearable by both households and companies and it came almost unnoticed 
(Schubert, 2019). Additionally, the TICPE for oil was also partially offset and 
companies covered by the EU-ETS were entitled to reimbursement of the tax. 
Consequently, the price signal goal of the carbon tax was clouded by the sharp fall 
in overall prices of raw materials (Gloriant, 2018). 
In 2018, the combination of a series of events, namely the announcement in 
November of an acceleration in the increase of the carbon tax, tax adjustments 
adopted to make gasoline and diesel prices converge, and an important increase of 
the oil price since 2016, led to public mobilisations, commonly known as the 
“Yellow Vests protests”, to protest the increase in the carbon price. For households 
living in non-metropolitan areas, which generally drove diesel cars for personal or 
professional activities, the increase was deemed unbearable (Criqui et al., 2019). 
Table 2 











Producer price 0,59 0,74 14,5 24,4 
Energy taxes 0,78 0,82 3,9 4,9 
Consumer price 1,37 1,56 18,4 13,4 
Diesel 
Producer price 0,58 0,77 18,2 31,2 
Energy taxes 0,64 0,71 7,6 11,9 
Consumer price 1,22 1,48 25,8 21,1 
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Note. In just a year, the cumulative effects of different factors that 
altered the final consumer price for oil led to important increases in fuel 
prices. Source: Schubert (2019). 
In fact, for the year 2018, it had already experienced an increase higher that the 
initially planned, as it was firstly expected to be of EUR 39 per tonne, but it turned 
out to be EUR 44.6/tCO2, after the Loi de Finances pour 2018 anticipated this. 
Following the Yellow Vest protests, the proposed increase for the year 2019 of EUR 
55 per tonne, together with the tax adjustment for the petrol and diesel gap, were 
abandoned, and the tax was frozen to EUR 44.6 per tonne, a price that has not yet 
been increased (Bureau et al., 2019). 
iii. Analysis of the effects of the CEE in France 
The CEE has had, so far, a short life, and a troubled one too. Some experts consider 
that to avoid the failure on the implementation of a carbon tax, four dimensions 
must be fulfilled: ecological efficacity, social justice, legal compliance, and politic 
acceptability (Berry and Laurent, 2019). In this section, we will focus on the 
ecological efficacity dimension, that it, the efficacity on reducing emissions. 
Unlike the case of the EU-ETS, studying the effects of the carbon tax in France’s 
CO2 emissions since its implementation turns out to be slightly more difficult. To 
carry out our research, we will assess what the trend on emissions has been since 
the implementation of the tax in 2014, and we will attempt to perform a regression 
analysis, for total emissions so far, but also for emissions in the road transport 
sector, expected to be slightly more sensible to the introduction of a carbon tax, due 
to the effects of the tax on the fuel price. Therefore, we will assess which has been 
the relationship between the price and the emissions, and the carbon price will be 
linked to emissions, in a slightly similar way compared to earlier. 
The data used for this assessment is that of emissions for the period 2010 – 2019, 
provided by the INSEE, considering the introduction of the first carbon price in the 
year 2014. To start with the analysis, we will begin with the construction of a plot 
for total emissions (Figure 16) and road transport emissions (Figure 17). Just like 
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for the EU-ETS, in the variable Y, referring to emissions, we will apply a log 
transformation to make our data distribution less skewed. 
Figure 16 
Scatter plot for the carbon tax price and the total emissions for the French economy 
(log transformation applied) 
 
Note. From the data on emissions on the INSEE and the carbon price 
established for each year in the Loi de Finances. 
Figure 17 
Scatter plot for the carbon tax price and the emissions of the French road transport 




Note. From the data on emissions on the INSEE and the carbon price 
established for each year in the Loi de Finances. 
A priori, from the scatter plots, we perceive, more easily than in the case of the EU-
ETS, that a higher carbon price (or carbon component, to be more precise) is linked 
to lower emissions. For our statistical models, our null hypothesis is there is no 
correlation between emissions and carbon price, and the alternative hypothesis is 
there is correlation. If, through our models, we rejected the null hypothesis, it would 
imply there is a relationship between French emissions and the carbon tax. 
For total emissions, the model specification was as follows: log(Total emissions) ~ 
b0 + b1 * Price, therefore, using only the linear term of price, expressed in EUR. 
The results from the regression show there were significant effects of the carbon 
component price on carbon emissions for the total of the French economy for a 
significance level of 5% (b1 = - 0.0023144, t(8) = -3.759, p = 0.00555). It shows 
that there is an inverse correlation between the French carbon price and the tonnes 
of CO2 emitted by the total of the economy (Figure 18). Therefore, the 
interpretation is that for every 1-unit increase in the Price variable, the 
log(Emissions) variable decreases by the beta coefficient value, that is, 0.0023144.  
Figure 18 
Regression line between the carbon tax price and the total emissions for the French 




The adjusted R-squared for our model is 0.5933. As a reminder, the R-squared, also 
known as coefficient of determination, shows how well the data points of our 
sample fit a line or curve. The adjusted R-squared also indicates this adequacy, but 
also adjusts for the number of terms of our model. That is, if we add more variables 
considered not useful, the adjusted R-squared decreases. This precision is made 
because the data points in our scatter plot seem to follow an exponential path rather 
than linear, so we might consider adding a quadratic term for the variable Price, to 
check if such specification would provide a better explanation for our model. 
The second model specification was as follows: log(Total emissions) ~ b0 + b1 * 
Price + b2 * Price2. The results from this non-linear regression show that there were 
significant effects of the carbon component price on carbon emissions for the total 
of the French economy for a significance level of 5% (b1 = - 5.504e-03, t(7) = -
2.584, p = 0.0363), but the non-significance of our quadratic term (b2 = 7.470e-05, 
t(7) = 1.554, p = 0.1642). However, the adjusted R-squared increases, with a value 
of 0.6544, thus this model fits our data better than the one with the linear regression. 
It shows that there is an inverse correlation between the French tax and the tonnes 
of carbon emitted by the country (Figure 19).  
Figure 19 
Non-linear regression between the carbon tax price and the total emissions for the 




Note. This model fits our data slightly better than the previous linear 
regression, corroborated by the adjusted R-squared. 
The interpretation of this second model is that, for the linear term, for every 1-unit 
increase in the Price variable, the log(Total emissions) variable is expected to 
decrease by 5.504e-03. The quadratic term, as a kind of interaction, tells us about 
the expected direction and change of our slope as the value of Price changes. Since 
7.470e-05 is positive, the slope is expected to be more positive as Price increases, 
and, for each 1-unit increase in the Price variable, the slope increases by 2 times 
the quadratic term (that is, the derivative of Price2), 7.470e-05 * 2. 
For emissions from the road transport sector, the model specification was as 
follows: log(Road transport emissions) ~ b0 + b1 * Price, again using only the linear 
term of price, expressed in EUR. The results from the regression show there were 
significant effects of the carbon component price on carbon emissions for the road 
transport sector for a significance level of 5% (b1 = -0.0022650, t(8) = -4.941, p = 
0.00113). It shows that, also for the road transport sector emissions, there is an 
inverse correlation between the French carbon tax price and the emissions (Figure 
20). The interpretation is that for every 1-unit increase in the Price variable, the 
log(Road transport emissions) variable decreases by 0.0022650. 
Figure 20 
Regression line between the carbon tax price and the emissions from the French 




Just like it was done with the linear regression model, if the adjusted R-squared is 
checked for this model, the value is 0.7224, which means that 72.24% of our data 
fits our model. But since the path of our data is rather not linear, and the introduction 
of a quadratic term in the case of total emissions was useful to draw a better model, 
it is also recommended to do the same here. 
The second model specification was as follows: log(Road transport emissions) ~ b0 
+ b1 * Price + b2 * Price2. The results from this non-linear regression show that 
there were significant effects of the carbon component price on carbon emissions 
for the total of the French economy for a significance level of 5% (b1 = -6.329e-03, 
t(7) = -6.895, p = 0.000232), and also the significance of our quadratic term (b2 = 
9.517e-05, t(7) = 4.593, p = 0.002504). Moreover, the adjusted R-squared increases, 
with a value of 0.921, versus the previous 0.7224. It shows again that there is an 
inverse correlation between the French carbon tax and the tonnes of carbon emitted 
by the road transport sector in France (Figure 21). 
Figure 21 
Non-linear regression between the carbon tax price and the emissions from the 
French road transport sector (log transformation applied) 
 
Note. This model fits our data slightly better again (also corroborated 
by the adjusted R-squared). 
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The interpretation of this second model is that, for the linear term, for every 1-unit 
increase in the Price variable, the log(Road transport emissions) variable is 
expected to decrease by 6.329e-03. For the quadratic term, since 9.517e-05 is 
positive, the slope is expected to be more positive as Price increases, and, for each 
1-unit increase in the Price variable, the slope increases by 2 times the quadratic 
term, that is, 9.517e-05 * 2.  
For both for the total emissions and the emissions from the road transport sector, 
this quadratic term leads us to a positive slope after reaching a certain carbon tax 
price. This is due to the quadratic term adjusting our regression by a parabolic 
function. It is important to remark, before drawing conclusions from this effect, that 
this increase in emissions lacks an empirical basis and that they are just an artifact 
of our econometric models. 
In any case, our conclusions for the analysis of the French carbon tax are that results 
have shown there is a significant relationship between the French carbon tax price 
and the emissions generated in France for the time it has been in force. Especially 
for the road transport sector, our models were capable of explaining in great 
measure the evolution of the emissions generated.  
However, our data worked with carbon tax prices as high as EUR 44.6, after the 
Yellow Vests protests led to its freeze, despite the tax expected to rise to EUR 100 
by the end of this decade. Even though the significant relationship between both 
variables has been stated by our models, the sudden freeze in the price of carbon 
limited our study findings, results that were already going to be limited by the short 
time frame considered for our study of the carbon tax. 
Again, like in the case of the EU-ETS, the results should be carefully considered 
and unquestionable statements regarding the French carbon tax and emissions 
should be avoided. Our models might fit our data, despite the carbon tax not being 
the only and most powerful driver on the evolution of emissions, but our models, 
regardless of their oversimplification, strictly show there is a significant 
relationship between the evolution of the carbon tax price in France and emissions, 
for the period 2010-2019. This is an analysis from the past, but future works will 
be advised on continuing studying the future trends. 
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The previous experiences with the carbon tax show that failing to communicate the 
tax properly leads to people believing that individual costs to adjust to the tax are 
immediate and high, while the benefits are late and uncertain. One of the main 
issues in the communication scope is the loudness of the anti-tax arguments, which 
are generally not true, but are effective enough to reach more people (Hourcade, 
2015). For the future increase of the carbon price in France’s CEE, which will 
undoubtedly be needed, this communication must be directed to address the 
perceived inadequacy between carbon taxation and environmental protection.  
Experts have figured out that the French population is not against the climate 
polices but the carbon tax. French people are concerned about the environment, but 
their beliefs about carbon taxation are biased by those anti-tax arguments, making 
the reintroduction of increases in the tax difficult in the short term (Douenne and 
Fabre, 2019). Therefore, future information campaigns should not only be 
addressed to improve citizen knowledge on climate change, but to clearly explain 
the role of climate policies, such as carbon taxation. 
It is important to reinforce the idea that an effective climate policy would require, 
not only a carbon pricing mechanism, but also instruments to ensure the revenue 
neutrality of the tax, and the combination with regulations and subsidies to 
incentivise the conversion and the innovation in the renewable fields, and green 
investments (Bureau et al., 2019). Since market imperfections exist and there are 
always concerns on the distributive effects of the tax, focusing the mitigation 
mechanisms of a country on a single price signal provided by the carbon tax is less 
recommendable than combining different types of climate policies (Douenne and 
Fabre, 2019). This could lead to wider public acceptance of the French carbon tax, 
and the possibility of reaching the EUR 100 target for 2030, by all odds, needed to 




First. Fighting climate change is probably the most important challenge of this 
century. Despite it not seeming strictly urgent, compared to other issues affecting 
the international community nowadays, the irreversible threats we face if it is not 
managed before it is too late, should push us to react with effective policies 
immediately. However, this is not the case in current international relations, where 
soft law agreements and heterogeneous and unequal, rarely binding commitments 
prevail. Efforts must be enhanced so that homogenous legally-binding instruments 
are signed by all Nations to fight climate change.  
Second. Since climate change is global, its effects will take place all over the planet. 
Nonetheless, an important remark of climate change is that it will not affect each 
country insomuch as the country contributed with its carbon emissions. Coastal 
areas will be affected by SLR, agriculture-based countries by the increase in 
temperatures, all of them independently to their contribution to climate change. 
Therefore, a strictly economic appraisal of the consequences of it, such as the one 
proposed by Nordhaus, is useful, but questionable, to the extent it values everything 
arbitrarily in monetary units. Principles of International Law, namely of solidarity, 
should also be taken into account, before assessing in terms of profitability the 
losses of disadvantaged communities. 
Third. Making the polluters pay for the carbon emissions they generate complies, 
not only with Environmental Law principles, such as the PPP, but also answers to 
an economic logic, as emissions are negative externalities that generate costs (if not 
in the immediate future, eventually, when public investments to deal with the 
effects of climate change will have to be made), unborn by the emitters. For that 
reason, carbon pricing is essential to allow the products in an economy to give a 
price signal on the carbon-intensity of their production processes, thus, making 
every single economic agent capable of making environmentally-sensible choices 
in their daily decisions on consumption, among others. 
Fourth. While cap-and-trade offers a favourable carbon pricing mechanism for 
companies, as they can gradually adapt their production processes to reduce 
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emissions, cap-and-trade is not necessarily superior to a carbon tax, since the latest 
can also include households, that constitute a great source of emissions, and 
implementation can be more straightforward. However, public support for taxes is 
low. Despite the evidence that they do indeed reduce carbon emissions, people tend 
to consider them environmentally inefficient and just as another tax burden with no 
significant effects on climate change mitigation. This might be one of the most 
complicated challenges in the implementation of a carbon tax as a mitigation policy. 
Fifth. The case of France illustrates on the difficulties that any other Member State 
might face to implement carbon taxation within its borders, not only due to its 
political difficulty, but also due to the inferences between the tax and the EU-ETS. 
It shows how it is possible to go from failure to success, still failing afterwards, if 
the tax is not properly designed to combine the different dimensions of carbon 
taxation. But since carbon pricing is essential for the national decarbonisation 
strategies, strong steps should be made to guarantee the success, as inefficient 
designs risk not allowing the desired effect on the reduction of emissions and might 
jeopardise the achievement of internationally-agreed pledges. 
Sixth. As regards the EU-ETS, we cannot conclude that this market carbon price 
causes emissions to decrease, but we have found there is a significant relationship, 
statistically talking, between these, at least for some of the highest emitting French 
companies subject to it. Yet, the reduction on the emissions could be due to other 
reasons, like the adoption of CSR strategies or other innovations for which a 
reduction on emissions would only come as an externality. This should not be 
regarded as a reason to abandon the EU-ETS, but rather to reflect on the fact that 
prices in the EU-ETS since its implementation might not been sufficiently high, nor 
stable, to signal companies on the need to reduce emissions. 
Seventh. Total emissions for France and for the road transport sector and the carbon 
tax evolution has been econometrically assessed and it has also been found that 
there is a significant relationship between these. The price signal of the tax is this 
case is clearer than in the EU-ETS, since the price was increased since its 
introduction in 2014 until 2018, when it was frozen due to public opposition. To 
continue assessing the effects of carbon taxation in France, future works are advised 
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to work with wider time frames, but especially after experiencing new price 
increases in the tax. Such data would reinforce the beliefs regarding the effectivity 
of carbon taxation to fight climate change if those higher prices triggered further 
emission reductions. 
Eight. As long as the two studied carbon pricing mechanisms coexist among 
Member States, a better balance is needed. Once Phase 4 of the EU-ETS kicks off 
and companies stop receiving free allowances, some kind of exceptions regarding 
the national taxes will have to be designed so that companies subject to the EU-ETS 
are not taxed twice. In order to establish tax exceptions accepted by the public 
opinion, it will be important to transparently communicate these exceptions. 
However, these exemptions will only be fair as long as the companies do not enjoy 
of extra benefits in the European ETS, such as free allowances or significantly lower 
carbon prices. The only effective, and also fair, mechanism to protect domestic 
industries will be the inclusion of a carbon border adjustment mechanism. 
Ninth. The importance of communication in carbon pricing should be understood 
in a wide sense. The resistance against carbon taxes by citizens mainly comes from 
biased opinions about the efficacy of these to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
It is a subject that has been widely studied by economists during the last decades, 
and it has been proven that carbon pricing mechanisms work for this purpose of 
reducing carbon emissions. Like in the case of France, the public is already 
generally concerned about climate change and environmental issues. Therefore, 
communication by public institutions must be directed to address the disinformation 
regarding these mechanisms, rather than the environmental awareness. 
Tenth. Fighting climate change might be questioned by current generations, for 
which duties before the planet exist, despite not being strictly responsible of the 
experienced changes, nor probably enjoying the future benefits of slowed climate 
change. Nevertheless, taking action on the planet is a matter of exemplarity across 
nations, and across generations. It might seem unfair to act when other nations are 
not engaging in the protection of the environment, but not us taking action would 
neither be fair for future generations. We cannot let ourselves to make them live in 
a world we altered to the extent it reported economic benefits, just because we put 
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a price on goods such as the “having polar bears in the wild” or “not making most 
of the Pacific islands disappear”, and mitigation was not economically desirable. 
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